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'NO RADAR ON SUNDAY'

 

Photograph courtesy of Glen & Steve Thistlewood

THE STORY OF

DAKOTA 

G-AGZB

A flight returning holidaymakers from the Channel Islands ends in tragedy on a fog shrouded hillside ....

but the causes of the accident have always remained a mystery.........

 

 

 

Zulu Bravo boarding passengers.

 

CHANNEL AIRWAYS

CHANNEL AIRWAYS  was based at Southend Airport. The operation was started by an RAF Squadron Leader after the war as East Anglian Flying Services Ltd and was the first airline to offer cut price high density flights that were convenient and affordable. The aim was to make flying as cheap as travel by sea - and it succeeded.  The airline began using a demobbed light aircraft and by the time it folded in 1970, Channel had been a major player in the domestic, cross Channel, European and charter business, running BAC 111 jets, Tridents and Viscount turbo props plus the ubiquitous Doves, Herons,  Dakotas and the Vickers Viking, a metal bodied development of the Wellington bomber.  They also operated Bristol Freighters as a passenger variant known as the Wayfarer.  The former was intended for car ferry services although the airline never actually carried vehicles, this being done by another Southend airline Air Charter Ltd.  Channel's main claim to fame in later years was that it began the  low cost package tours as we know them  today, being the fore runner of  Ryan Air, Easyjet and the other low cost carriers .

The 1962 in flight Brochure

 

Many of the Channel fleet were ex BEA 'Pionair' Dakotas, often in the same colour scheme with only a change of operator's name.

 

However, in the 1960's Channel was mainly a Summer airline, most aircraft being laid up during the Winter although by 1962 they were operating a daily service to the continent and the Channel Islands.  During the holiday season planes ran almost non stop at full capacity flying the cross Channel and Channel Island routes as well as operating what was virtually an aerial bus service along the South Coast, using grass airstrips and small airfields that the other carriers ignored.  It really was a people's airline, dedicated to a low cost, no frills service.

The managing director was a far sighted businessman.  As well as holding the Air Force Cross for his services as a transport pilot and wartime test pilot, he had ideas we take for granted today but revolutionary in the 1960's.  Advertising stressed the benefit of flying from Southend, claiming it was faster for anyone living in South London to catch the electric train to the South Coast and fly with Channel rather than fight their way through the traffic to Gatwick or Heathrow. Channel introduced coach/air link services between the main southern towns and their airfields, serving places as far away as Ipswich, Reading and Eastbourne.  The airline took a lease on Ipswich Airport and developed the site, using the areas between the runways as farmland, growing crops on 165 acres of what would otherwise have been redundant grass needing regular maintenance. ( This was in the days when birds were not such a danger to aero engines !). 

 

Channel was a happy airline, full of larger than life characters many who had come into aviation during the War, and owned by a flying enthusiast,  described by his secretary as a 'true gentleman' who would think nothing of giving his staff a lift to work in the Rolls on a wet day, ( to their great embarrassment!) and helping out airside heaving baggage into aircraft as and when needed. There is still a tremendous affection for the Airline from ex-employees and staff.  It had its moments, like any organization, but there was nothing else quite like Channel Airways. They loved it.

The Southend Airport Reservations Office

( from the 1962 in flight brochure )

However the airline was in business to make money. Established policy was to minimize capital employed, and hence fares, by the use of older planes which were operated intensively, often without even fully repainting them! Seating density was the highest for any airline at the time, but routes were short and passengers were not in the aircraft for long. On occasion they wodul even strip out the toilet to put in an additional row of seats for a busy schedule !  In the case of the aircraft involved in this story, the plane had been purchased as a near write off, and repaired using parts from another crashed Dakota, although this happens even today - we just don't get to hear about it!   However the aircraft flew many times afterwards and there is no indication at all that this played any part in events.

 

Channel did have a number of incidents and crashes over the years, but nothing like this one.  Given the type of operation and the intensity of the take off and landing cycles, together with the primitive nature of airfields and facilities, their safety record was very very good.  Apart from this accident, they had very few injuries, a fatal accident when a fitter was working under an aircraft when the landing gear collapsed, and they lost two passenger aircraft at Portsmouth on the same afternoon when both aquaplaned on wet grass and ran off the runway.  However the Ventnor incident was the only fatal crash or loss involving passengers.

To have this superb record during a period when airlines were pushing the boundaries of operating procedures stands well alongside the National flag carriers of the day who did not operate as intensively and had far more money for non essential maintenance,  better facilities and higher rates of pay.  Cannel Airways planes may have been well worn, the seat pitch may have been small and operations intense, but they seem to have been well maintained where it mattered.  However in common with many airlines at the time, and even today, there seems to have been something of a 'press on regardless'  attitude by the management, and possibly a dislike of bureaucracy  at a time when this was beginning to invade the air transport sector. 

More concerning, as we shall see later , was a willingness to operate in marginal weather conditions -  Channel  would still be flying when all their competitors were grounded. This may have made economic sense with low fares and operating margins, but it did not please the authorities and the weather minima -  at what point flights were cancelled due to poor visibility and conditions -   were the subject of an on-going 'discussion' at the time of the crash.  Indeed,  poor weather formed a major aspect of the accident enquiry and was a prominent feature in events.

However we must not apply operating standards from the 21st Century to ex military transport planes in 1962 which were providing low budget fares when most aviation was still for the wealthy - and hind sight is always useful.

 

An unknown Dakota on an unknown airfield - these two photographs from an unknown source epitomise the excitement of 1960's air travel. Notice how the passengers, although on a low cost flight still 'dressed' for the journey.

PORTSMOUTH AIRPORT

Most of Channel's problems seem in hindsight to have revolved around this 270 acre grass airfield, situated just 12 feet above sea level and built on marshland next to the shoreline of Portsea Island.  Although it had been well used before the war, it was never fully developed by the Council who owned the site and although at the forefront of South Coast aviation, it was never regarded by the authorities as much more than a large flying field with a passenger terminal.  As we shall see, this was to be a fundamental aspect of the accident.  Portsmouth airport was always the poor relation and when in 1967 two Channel Airways HS.748 aircraft slid off the grass following a heavy rain shower, the airport began to decline, finally closing in 1973 when it was redeveloped for housing.  

However in 1962, Portsmouth was Channel's newest operating base and they were the first operator since the end of the war to bring passengers there direct from Europe.  The Portsmouth - Channel Islands service was also the fastest direct link from the mainland and to cater for the traffic Channel Airways built their own terminal building adjacent to the Southsea - Portsmouth dual carriageway to provide easy road access.  The terminal included a restaurant, cocktail bar  and Customs Hall and was a major investment for the airline.  It is thus beyond comprehension that the local Council and the Air Ministry did not respond in kind.  Given the amount of trade being brought to the city by Channel Airways, which had turned a backwater flying field into a thriving airport with daily international connections, there was almost no improvement in facilities, and incredibly no air traffic control system or communications.  Despite all the traffic that was using the facility by 1962, there was no approach radar, the nearest being at Thorney Island and operated by the RAF (but not as we shall see at the weekends ), and there was no method of communicating with aircraft other than by use of a very pistol and coloured flares.  Even in 1962 this is difficult to comprehend.

 

Preparing for take off - Zulu Delta running up engines

Despite all the development and investment by airlines, the owners of Portsmouth Airport did not see fit to install a basic two way radio to enable a ground controller to speak to aircraft using the airport, and the Air Ministry were content to let this situation exist. It was an accident waiting to happen, and while the subsequent  crash took place many miles away, it was this lack of basic communication facilities that would begin to build the pyramid of circumstances that ended high on the slopes of St Boniface Down.  If the crew had been able to call up Portsmouth and ask if the weather was clear enough for a visual approach, which it was on the return flight, the train of events would never have begun.

THE DAKOTA

The Douglas DC3 ( also known as the C47 in freight form ) and popularly known in England as the 'Dakota' was a pre war design that is still in commercial use today.  It was very advanced aerodynamically, yet simple, rugged and above all reliable and very strong for use on bad landing strips. Even after the War it was state of the art, made possible by the introduction of high output, reliable are engines. The aircraft was so adaptable that several have been re-engined with turbo-prop units and fly commercially today and it causes some concern to commercial aircrew to be passed and outclimed by an aircraft that ferried paratroopers across the Channel on D-Day!   Conventional piston engined 'twin wasp' DC3's are still hard at work on relief and transport duties in many countries as well as oil pollution dispersal work in the UK.

'Morning' - a painting for the memorial project by Becky Turner.

The design combined semi-retractable main wheels ( the bottom part of the tyres did not retract into the wings but didn't seriously affect the drag as they were smooth).  This improved fuel consumption and speed, and the modern all metal construction, at a time when some modern aircraft were still wooden, gave a spacious fuselage, wide floor and good payload. With an all metal skin, modern instruments and flight controls, it was one of the first passenger aircraft to have a safe performance with one engine shut down , partly due to the power to weight ratio and also because the designer had the engines tucked in as close as possible to the centre line to reduce problems with single engine flight. The plane could even take off unladen on one engine. There was a good power to weight ratio which gave excellent take off and climb out from small airfields and a useful load carrying ability.  The DC3 was essentially the first modern airliner and freighter.

There were many post war accidents involving the type  and a look at the records show that there was an incident  every few days somewhere in the World, a minor airfield shunt, a forced landing, and sometimes a crash.  As a hugely popular workhorse which opened up aviation to the public, this does not mean that the design was in any way unsafe -  in fact  many would argue that the DC3 is the most successful aircraft of all time and even today has few rivals. There were just a lot more of them, available as war surplus and thus cheap, and they were often worked to the limit in terms of performance, loading and conditions. The number of accidents must be put down to generally lower standards in the aviation industry at the time, use by marginal operators with poor or non existent service facilities, inexperienced crews, bad landing grounds, operation in atrocious weather conditions,  and statistically, the large number of hours flown by the type. Emphatically, the DC3 was not unsafe.

The iconic outline of the Dakota in shadow photographed from the aircraft as it crosses the coastline.

As airlines slowly became more regulated after the War the losses began to drop, but the air transport business was still something of a free for all and even major airlines such as BEA lost planes to collisions and navigational errors.   It was not until a rigid and prescriptive Air Traffic Control scheme was introduced and airlines were required to follow standard procedures and  pre arranged flight plans that things began to improve.

 

G-AGZB

G-AGZB was an ex RAF  military transport  aircraft.  It was built in Santa Monica in 1943 , used by the RAF until demobbed in 1946 and sold to Railway Air Services, the airline arm of the railway companies before nationalization,  who used it for passenger work. 

Renfrew in May 1946 when owned by Railway Air Services

Photograph by the late E. J. Riding courtesy of Richard Riding

 

In civvies for the first time.   Zulu Bravo joined Railway Air Services in 1946 .......

Copyright photograph kindly supplied by The A.J. Jackson Collection for this site.

..... and then became an early member of the British European Airways fleet ...

Copyright photograph kindly supplied by The A.J. Jackson Collection for this site.

...........   and later flew as a 'Pionair', named after British pioneers of aviation, in this case Sir Robert Smith-Barry who developed the first successful method of 'dual control' pilot training during WW1.

Copyright photograph kindly supplied by The A.J. Jackson Collection for this site.

 

pic source unknown

The aircraft in BEA colours at Hanover when in service as a 'BEA Pionair'...

... and running up for takeoff at an unknown airfield 'somewhere in England'...

note the Royal Mail logo just ahead of the tail and the aircraft's 'name' Sir Robert Smith-Barry.  The illustration below is of the 'Corgi' scale model of one of ZB's sisters ( and is a superb model for anyone who likes the Dakota!)

G-AGZB was used until the Dakota was phased out by BEA and in fact completed the last Dakota flight by the airline - at the end of which it ran off the runway while flown by a senior BEA Captain and was badly damaged! There were no injuries apart from pride although one of the passengers had heard about the fog at Elmdon ( Birmingham ) and had asked the Pilot if they would crash.  Naturally he answered most emphatically 'no' but had to eat his words.  The aircraft was a mess however and took over a year to rebuild, although this may have been done as a 'hospital job' when there was a gap in work schedules.

Channel Airways  were on the lookout for low budget planes and bought the aircraft 'as seen'.  Taken to Southend Airport on a low loader the plane was fully rebuilt using parts from another Dakota that had crashed and had an engine fire on take off from Birmingham airport.  The type was ideally suited to Channel's operations which involved basic airstrips, many with grass runways, where the power and rugged design were a great advantage. Other contemporary airliners like the Dove and Heron were good performers but didn't have the grass strip performance and  robust dependability of the DC3.

Limited edition illustration by the late Dave Williams - drawn specially for this memorial site.

View full colour profile of this illustration

 

Identical twin – Zulu Delta awaits passengers.

 

THE CREW

The crew of the plane were flying enthusiasts.  The Captain - a Belgian aristocrat by birth, although he never made mention of the fact or pulled 'rank' - had flown the route over 90 times previously. He learned to fly in 1950 and had over 7000 hours flying time in his log book,  600 as pilot in command on Dakotas.   Everyone who flew with the Captain will testify to his charm, generosity, courtesy and professional approach. He left his mark on many colleagues and was a devoted family man.   Even today, many years later, those who knew him speak of him with deep affection and as someone special.

The First Officer was new to the Airline, but an experienced RAF Transport Command pilot with over 4000 hours.  Living in Southend on Sea, the home of Channel Airways he was a motor sport enthusiast,  had tried a career in accountancy after leaving the Services, but flying was in his blood and when a chance came to join Channel, he took it.

Both pilots had young families and a very steady, professional approach to flying passenger aircraft. They were fully qualified to fly the plane in all conditions and massively experienced in the aviation industry. They were neither inexperienced nor reckless as one newspaper claimed. One journalist, presumably looking for a sensation and regardless of the distress caused,  tried to imply that there had been a 'race' between two planes of the same airline.  The other aircraft, a de  Haviland 'Dove' was scheduled for the same destination and took off shortly before the Dakota.  This was carrying passengers while Zulu Bravo had passengers and freight;  overspill from the delays caused by fog, and Channel Islands daffodils and irises destined for Covent Garden Market. Who went on which aircraft was a matter for fate to decide.

pic source unknown

The stewardess learned French at night school so that she could get a job with the airline. All three were respected and well liked by colleagues.  They come over as being a thoroughly nice, reliable and professional crew who would do all they could to help their passengers, but would not break safety rules -  as was shown on the outward flight, details of which will follow.

Like something from a Greek tragedy, none should have been flying that day.  Due to the delays that had built up because all flights had been grounded by the dreadful weather, all three had been called in at the last moment to operate an additional service in an attempt to return stranded passengers as soon as there was any chance of flying.  The Pilot and Stewardess were on standby, and looking forward to a day off, and the Co-pilot was scheduled to fly on a 'Viking' but was swapped at the last moment to the Channel Islands run.  In each case the telephone call from the Airline would spell disaster and shatter the lives of their families.  However, there may already have been a 'mind set' in place - an extra flight, stand by-duty and stranded passengers needing to get home.  Perhaps the beginnings of the tragedy were in place even before those first phone calls.

 

The flight deck of a Dakota.

 

THE WEATHER

The weather on 6th May could be divided into two sections.  Over England, dense fog had grounded the airlines and after a holiday period which had seen a lot of outward traffic, there was great pressure to get everyone home again.  Unfortunately the South Coast was still seriously affected by fog and low cloud, but across the Channel the weather was glorious, Jersey and Guernsey basking in full sun. 

WEATHER FORECAST

 

A copy of the actual forecast provided to the crew.

Valid 1200 hrs to 1700 hrs

3/8 - 6/8 cloud between 600 - 1000 feet

Possibility of complete cloud cover on exposed coasts

Surface visibility 6 - 10 miles but 1 - 2 miles in rain

Extensive hill fog

Visibility 500 - 1000 yards in hill fog 

Wind Westerly 15 - 18 kts gusting to 30 kts.

At the time weather in the Portsmouth region was given ( and later confirmed) as

3/8 cloud at 100 feet

Full cloud cover at 300 feet.

Approaching the coast there was a real possibility of meeting a wall of cloud above 300 feet.  The forecast visibility would then give between 5 - 10 seconds flying time to avoid obstructions.  In fact the Isle of Wight coastline was completely shrouded in fog, virtually to sea level.

Visibility was outside the acceptable landing minima for the DC3 at Portsmouth airport, even if Thorney Radar had been operating.  However without any form of communication the crew didn't know.  Even in 1962 it seems incredible that there was no radio at the airport or even why no one on the ground in Jersey thought to phone  up and ask someone at the destination to look out of the window .....

VIEW FLIGHT PLAN MAP

 

Page impression from  Isle of Wight County Press - with thanks. Copies can be obtained from their offices at Newport I-O-W. Click the page for a larger copy.

THE FLIGHT

pic source unknown

The aircraft flew a cross Channel trip in the early morning, landed at Southend and took on a fresh crew who had been on standby and not expecting to fly that day. The Captain was not with his usual first officer and instead flew with a relative newcomer to the airline but someone, who as we have already seen, had great experience at flying transport and passenger aircraft.

Zulu Bravo took off again at 9.37 am, on the outward trip from Southend, heading for Portsmouth and after that the Channel Islands on a relief flight to retrieve fog bound holiday makers - hence the need for a standby - extra - crew.  There were no landing aids for Portsmouth  airfield  and having made an attempt to get in, with a runway just 7 feet above sea level and no communication with the ground, poor visibility forced the crew to abort the landing at 10.32 am and fly direct to Guernsey.  This had been discussed before take off and the crew were prepared for it.   Having made a standard instrument approach which showed that a landing was out of the question, the Captain called London air traffic control advising that they 'couldn't get in to Portsmouth' and then diverted to the Channel Islands.  

 Unfortunately this failed attempt may have set in train the events which followed.  It was clear that the weather was far too bad to attempt a standard let down and that the only way in for a large aircraft like the Dakota would be to go 'under' the weather on the last stages of the flight.  Without radio, the assessment of the conditions and 'runway visual range' was up to the Captain and thus there was an implied operational requirement that the plane should at least attempt a landing approach before diverting - otherwise they would not know it was impossible! This would seem to explain why the crew were attempting an approach, even in what might, to a layman,  have seemed hopeless conditions.

Alarmingly very low level approaches to Portsmouth were not unheard of, so what they proposed was not as unusual as it would be today where all Hell would be let loose when the authorities came to hear of it.  On occasions Channel planes actually damaged sailing yacht masts of boats moored in the approaches, so this was par for the course. They really did have to come in that low on foggy days so as not to lose sight of the ground.  And today there was no Ground Control Approach Radar to help.

After loading passengers and freight in Guernsey, the plane flew to Jersey landing at 12.25pm.  There was another Channel Aircraft parked on the ramp, flown by the chief pilot of the airline.  This was also scheduled for Portsmouth, Zulu Bravo being sent to carry the passengers that were now overbooked on the original flight due to the bad weather. More passengers boarded and a quantity of fresh flowers were put aboard as freight.  

The crew discussed the weather with the met officer at the airport and then had a somewhat heated discussion in the crew room with senior airline staff about the desirability of attempting Portsmouth on the way back.  Zulu Bravo's captain was apparently highly reluctant to make another attempt at landing there.  Known as a meticulous pilot, he knew the risks, had tried i earlier and decided it wasn't safe.  Now he was expected to try again. This delayed the flight for a few minutes and tempers were frayed when Zulu Bravo's flight crew joined the plane for the home run with a planned return flight across the Channel at 3000 feet.

As all passengers were booked to Portsmouth there was a strong commercial incentive for both planes to reach the airfield, although diversions were given as Southend and Stanstead if it was impossible to get in to the grass airstrip.   There was a short delay before take off.  One passenger,  an employee of the airline who had been unable to obtain a seat on the original aircraft,  noticed the frantic hand signals from the doorway of the other plane and took this opportunity to leave their seat, run across the tarmac and leap aboard the other aircraft, taking  advantage of a last minute cancellation.  Back on Zulu Bravo, the Captain, passed a message to the passengers, via the Stewardess, telling them that he would 'do his best' to get them to Portsmouth. He was not a happy man!  Leaving Jersey with up to the minute weather reports,  and  their much delayed passengers, the return flight began at 1.54 pm in good weather.

Jersey Airport in 1961 - passengers disembark from a Vickers Viking.

( from the 1962 in flight brochure )

After climbing to 3000 feet the crew reported they had Alderney in sight at 14.07.  They reported again in mid Channel - on their dead reckoning - at 14.14 hrs.  However as the plane reached this point it encountered a wedge shaped cloud formation that eventually went all the way down to sea level.  This was considerably worse than expected with mist, dense hill fog, drizzle and a stiff breeze. 

Subsequent enquiries and our own research indicates that having failed to land at Portsmouth on the outward leg of the journey, the crew knew how bad the visibility had been and were tasked with getting their passengers home if at all possible. They decided to 'let down' over the sea, intending to fly at low level across the Solent and make a visual approach 'under the weather' to the airfield. As the runway was effectively at sea level, once they had a visual marker they could  line up and land without having to fly into the clouds, at which point without radar direction they would have had to give up and divert to Southend.  This low approach was not unusual although as we have seen, Zulu Bravo's Captain was not happy to do this. 

From the 1962 timetable.  This map shows the original track in red, with the approximate crash site marked, and what we believe to have been the proposed route to fly under the weather, shown in blue.  The critical point was to pick up the coast of the Isle of Wight where visibility was expected to be about half a mile at low level. That's not far when travelling at 180 miles per hour!

Channel operated in lower visibility than the other regional airlines,  the crew were experienced and the Dakota had good performance!  Given that landing had been impossible on the way out, the crew probably thought that this would be the only chance of getting their passengers to their intended destination - otherwise they would have been taken to Southend, many miles from home, with further inconvenience to them and expense for the airline.  They had been delayed for many hours by fog and bad weather and with children and honeymooners on board, the pilots were pulling out 'all the stops' to get them back - and the company didn't want passengers arriving at the wrong airport. The original flight plan was abandoned and the only safe option was to get down really low, in good time before the cloud bank was reached, and fly under the weather. 

A radio message at 2.15 pm as the plane passed Alderney, requested permission from London Air Traffic Control to come down to 1000 feet and the crew were careful to check and confirm the barometric pressure to ensure that their altimeters were set correctly, thus they were clearly aware of the need for accurate navigation and height on  the next leg of the trip.  Still over the sea the aircraft flew on, descending steadily and presumably intending to make landfall on the Southern tip of the Isle of Wight and then follow the coast. 

Unfortunately a combination of factors, each one on its own being little more than an irritating  -  higher wind speed,  unexpectedly worse visibility, lower cloud base and a slightly different wind direction ( these are assumptions - not proven facts )  allowed the plane to reach the Isle of Wight a few second earlier than planned and in a dense bank of fog and cloud that went down to sea level, a few miles further East of projected track, and at perhaps the one spot where the ground could not be quickly identified. The difference in wind speed was small, and well within the margin of error, but when coupled with lower than forecast visibility, it put the aircraft slightly off track, and between 5 and 6 miles  nearer the coast which extended further into the Channel at that point.  It seems likely that given these factors, at the time when the Captain thought he was just over five miles off the coast and was beginning to turn and abort the low level approach, the Dakota was flying in dense cloud and crossing the coast,  head on into 1000 foot high hills. The margin was just a few seconds flying time. The plane was 78 feet too low.

The aircraft had one radio navigation aid - a non directional beacon system tuned to the transmitter at Thorney Island ( TI ) at the Eastern end of the Solent.  NDB navigation provides a reference to a known point where the transmitter is situated, like an aerial lighthouse, but it is unreliable at low altitude and in this case the 'TI' transmitter was also masked by the land mass of the Island. At best it was misleading - at worst the receiver in the plane could actually have been giving wrong information as the direction finder would have lost the signal and begun to 'hunt' for it, the needle moving randomly about the dial.  Although the crew would have been aware of this possibility,  with only one instrument, there would have been no cross reference to check for errors.

Although the flight crew would have been flying on instruments in the cloud as the plane descended, one of them would have been watching intently for the coast to appear as they broke through the forecast cloud base between 600 and 1000 feet.  Tragically the location where the plane reached the coast was perhaps the one spot where  a blind valley above the town of Ventnor mimicked the coastline in appearance and direction at the point of intended landfall just a few miles further along. A matter of yards either way and it is doubtful if the accident would have happened.  The crew may have had a severe fright but would have been high enough to miss the ground!

Unfortunately the cloud was much lower than expected and we believe that the plane was still in zero visibility when it crossed the coast.  If the crew did glimpse the Isle of Wight, they  may have mistaken the Western ( right hand side as you look at it in the picture below ) side of Coombe Bottom (left photo) for the cliffs at Bonchurch a few miles further East. ( Right  photo).

     

Coombe Bottom                     Bonchurch   

Click a photo for detailed image and topographical information

This would have appeared at the correct angle to the track of the plane. As the other side of the valley was lost in the cloud, the crew may have seen what they expected to,  assumed they were still over the sea and turned slightly to fly along the 'coast' and across Sandown Bay - or out to sea to abort the approach and fly on to Southend.  They may have seen nothing at all.  Either way, the plane was now over land, in a blind valley, and flying directly towards St Boniface Down,  just moments from impact. The margin of error was only about 5 seconds - but it was enough.

At 2.28 pm the local coastguard heard, but could not see, a low flying plane, and a few seconds later a taxi driver at Ventnor station was startled as a huge aircraft roared over the roof of the building. In Ventnor, Television screens flickered as the huge aircraft disrupted the signal.

At 2.29 pm GMT, flying on a bearing of 050 degrees ( T ) Channel Airways Dakota G-AGZB  struck the southern face of St Boniface Down, just 1000 yards from Ventnor town centre and 78 feet below the summit of the hill on the upper edge of a pathway below the radar station.

The plane was already in a steady climbing turn to starboard ( right ) although this seems to have been a planned manoeuvre and not an evasion,  and it seems likely that the descent was already being aborted . There was no warning of what lay ahead and the passengers were reading or looking out at the blanket of cloud surrounding the plane. Suddenly the engines went to maximum power, the plane banked steeply and the nose came up sharply as a  hillside loomed out of the fog.   It was only a matter of seconds, and just too late. One of the survivors reported that the crew gave the engines full power and the way this was done indicated that the plane was in trouble. Despite full throttle the plane just would not climb fast enough to get clear.  Realizing they were going in, the Captain flung the plane into an opposite bank, attempting to level the wings to make a crash landing; his final action was to close the throttles, indicating that his thoughts were now to mitigate the impact. It was this final manoeuvre that saved some of his passengers. The aircraft hit the rising ground just outside the radar station compound, bounced violently over the fence,  the tail tearing through two sections of the chain link fence and flattening the posts.   The aircraft missed the concrete bases of one of the old radar towers, and slammed onto the ground in the centre of the compound before careering across the gorse and heather, striking the old radar receiver building and skidding another 100 yards until it came to rest straddling the access road through the site on the very highest point of St Boniface Down.

However it did not cartwheel or break up and the controlled and level way in which it hit the hill gave some the chance of survival by reducing the initial deceleration and allowing the inertia to be absorbed progressively and not in one shattering impact.

A typical Channel Airways scene - this is aboard a  Bristol 'Wayfarer' but would have been similar to the DC3 apart from the height of the cabin. 

 ( Note the very low seat 'pitch' - less leg room meant more passengers!  From the 1962 in flight brochure )

 

The aircraft left an impact crater that is still visible under the vegetation, and the track over the ground is even visible on Google Earth as there is a change in vegetation along the path taken by the wreckage.

Conditions were so bad that a party of Civil Defence volunteers exercising just 250 yards from the crash were unaware that it had happened and it was left to a local man, Ted Price who had been picking bean sticks on the hillside, to demonstrate incredible bravery by entering the burning wreck and  rescuing seven survivors.

The emergency services swung into operation, alerted by a blind radio enthusiast on the Island and members of Northampton Radio Club who were operating on the Down that day.  They not only alerted the authorities via another amateur on the mainland but provided rescue facilities and emergency communications until the Police were able to get a radio car to the site.

Click for Short Wave Magazine reprint and illustration

Staff at Ventnor Station also heard the accident and dialed 999.    Emergency services were on the scene in just a few minutes and within a quarter of an hour the survivors were on their way to hospital, an extremely rapid response given the conditions and location of the accident at the top of a 1 in 2, single track road. Following their departure it was left to the Police and Fire Brigade to damp down the remains and  secure the area.

Around tea time the mist and fog  lifted to reveal  a lovely sunny evening.  It was too late.

Roll of honour: click the logo below:

SO WHAT WENT WRONG ?

click thumbnail picture above for more information on

'THE WEATHER FACTOR' & OTHER THEORIES ON WHAT MIGHT HAVE GONE WRONG.

OTHER FACTORS ?

Extracts from Accident Report

These days an accident in the circumstances leading to the loss of G-AGZB is almost unthinkable.  With advanced navigation, communications, radar and fixed procedures, a decision to deviate from a flight plan, and come down to 1000 feet in thick cloud on a scheduled flight -  for what ever reason, would just not happen without extreme circumstances like engine failure or a massive technical problem.  However in the 1960's with local grass airstrips, basic navigation and a 'take off and fly' approach to aviation, passengers were sometimes dependent on the 'seat of the pants' flying skill of the crew and reliability of elderly piston engines and airframes. 

The 'local' radar station at Thorney Island that could have provided vital navigational assistance for a standard approach to Portsmouth, although not the landing itself, did not operate on Sundays, the day of the accident, and Portsmouth Airfield had no radio communications.  Thus it was impossible to advise the crew of the current weather conditions - the airfield couldn't even pass on instructions for landing. Ironically, another  aircraft on the same route, at almost the same time, landed safely having made a standard instrument approach. (You may wish to review weather reports and weather minima information concerning this landing.)

The Dakota was powered by two Pratt & Whitney 'Twin Wasp' engines.

 

The accident enquiry could find nothing technically wrong with the aircraft or altimeter settings, although there was not much left to find as the aircraft was almost totally destroyed and then burned out.  As the crew had requested a mid Channel descent to 1000 feet, their height and position appeared to have been intentional.  The crash investigators asked a number of questions  about the flight and the navigational information supplied by the airline as this appeared to be seriously out of date and incomplete,  giving potentially misleading information about the use of radar on the approach to Portsmouth and the workings of the radio beacon system.  The fact that the radar was inoperative on Sundays - the day of the crash - wasn't even mentioned in the flight manual.  Yet  the aircraft was sent out from its base on an extra service with the specific intention of returning passengers to Portsmouth when conditions were worse than would be acceptable for landing even if the radar had been available.  However the ultimate destination, the Channel Islands, were clear of fog, and the plane could divert, which is what happened on the outward flight. There was nothing wrong in this, but it seems a huge waste of flying time and fuel when it must have been known by those who arranged the movement that a landing was likely to be abortive and that the passengers would be further inconvenienced by a long diversion and return trip by road - but they would at least be on the mainland.

The weather forecast was said by the crash investigators to have been accurate - generally it was, although there was a weather station report from Hurn airfield at Christchurch indicating the potential for a serious local deterioration around the Island that seems to have gone unnoticed - and this deterioration, with a stronger onshore wind and cloud base of just 200 feet, although not extending over a great area,  was a major factor in events that followed. 

At the time, forecast visibility was about 500 - 1000 yards while the actual visibility on land was reported to be about 100 feet with a blanket cloud base of 300 feet asl and possibly right down to the water in places.  The forecast suggested that  cloud would begin about 600 feet and be almost solid at 1000 feet but could occasionally be as low as 300 feet on exposed coasts. This was awful, and if it extended to Portsmouth would have made landing impossible without 'minima busting' which this crew had already shown they would not do.  However the forecast may have given the crew confidence to descend over the Channel as they advised London ATC, thinking they would have sufficient time to see the water, the shoreline  and the Isle of Wight.  It might explain why they were as low as they were in that area and provide a key to subsequent events.  Based on the expected weather conditions and having a weather forecast under an hour old, the crew's actions were entirely logical based on an attempt to reach a low lying airfield with no communications. They fully expected to see the water and coast at 1000 feet and when they didn't were turning away, presumably on dead reckoning. 

There is no evidence that the Crew flew below the minimum permitted height over water, but if the wind was slightly stronger than expected, as has been postulated by a recent professional interpretation of the weather charts, this would have placed the plane nearer the island than expected if navigating on dead reckoning.  They had no external navigation aid and the NDB at Thorney Island could not give an accurate indication at low altitude as transmissions were masked by the Island.  Thus if they had come down to low level, believing they they would see the coast in good time, realised this was not so  and were turning out to sea having given up the attempt at a let down, everything is in place to explain the crash. ( This is discussed in more detail at a later point ).

 

Timetable images from

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There is also the matter of pressure on crews to fly.   Stranded and delayed passengers mean ill feeling,  hotel bills, meals and a subsequent backlog of flights as planes are out of position - that is lost money for the operator and Channel was a low budget airline.  While there is no evidence at all that any pressure was ever exerted by the Company, one must wonder about that heated argument in the crew room at Jersey and if an experienced crew would really have flown willingly in these conditions , with limited navigational aids to a fogbound airfield.

Would an experienced Captain who had flown the route over 90 times in the last year and had been described as meticulous, really  have dropped to 1000 feet in an attempt to 'hedge hop' round the coast in a loaded airliner without a very good reason.  We can never know.  Perhaps he just wanted to do his best for his passengers and get them home after a long delay. That was what the Stewardess told the passengers just before departure - 'the Captain will do his best to get you all to Portsmouth'.   He was after all on a standby flight to ferry delayed  holidaymakers to the mainland, but pressure on crews to operate to the limit of weather, flying time and technical faults are a well known problem in almost every airline and naturally if something untoward happens, the crew get the blame,  while those exerting the invisible force just  melt into the background. In this case there is no evidence at all,  but there rarely is. It still happens today - even with the flag carrier airlines.  Crews mention it at their peril.

 

G-AGNK - another of the ex BEA fleet.

 

There had been official concern about the safety minima for bad weather operation used by the airline.  This had been 'under discussion' with the Ministry for some time before the crash, but the matter was not concluded as officials were taken up with the issue of the newly introduced 'Operators Licences' and didn't get round to following it up.   It might be argued that if the Airline's policy and operating limits had prevented the flight leaving Southend in the weather conditions known to prevail at the time, then the circumstances leading to the accident could not have arisen - but hindsight is a wonderful thing and as explained previously, we must not use modern day judgments on events from a different era.  As demonstrated on the way  out, diversions were possible and there was no reason not to fly as a number of airfields were open and clear of fog, thus while the intended destination might be impossible, other perfectly safe airports were only a few minutes away.

Further the crew knew the route and Channel had been flying it for years without accident, even if a few yachts had their masts trimmed, so the decision to go was in some respects custom and practice. Weather like this around the Island is not uncommon and it would be no issue - other than aggravation for the passengers - if they had to divert.  Sadly to make sure there was sufficient fuel for a diversion, the fuel tanks were topped up, which did nothing to ameliorate the consequences.

However, and while not applying hindsight, you may ask why a plane full of holidaymakers was ever sent out - or permitted to set out - to attempt an approach to a fogbound airfield. If the plane had remained in Jersey, even for a few hours, despite the expense and inconvenience to operator and passengers alike, this crash is highly unlikely to have happened.

Channel planes flew in weather that grounded the other airlines on the South Coast and as we have seen, the Air Ministry were already concerned about flying in such  poor visibility. There was a lot of correspondence and negotiation, but it would seem that the Airline was slow to improve safety margins further than appeared strictly necessary, and unfortunately although the authorities were prepared to write letters and make abortive phone calls, they didn't actually do anything until it was too late.   Interestingly, and in the light of these ongoing 'discussions' with the Air Ministry over weather minima,  the airline were later at great pains to claim that conditions at Portsmouth played no part  in the accident -  and the Air Ministry Investigator agreed!

The question that should have been asked was not 'why were Channel flying that day' - but 'why were they permitted to even contemplate an approach to Portsmouth airport'. That was for the authorities to answer, not to blame the Captain and use him as a scapegoat.

If one considers that the Ministry was actively involved in the incident, both regarding flight operations, weather minima, operator and aircraft certification, and indirectly the Met Office,  it could be argued that they were investigating themselves!  Perhaps the conclusion was not altogether surprising - some things never change.

Another Channel DC3  waiting for her passengers at the beginning of another day on the South Coast run. Note the different livery - to reduce costs the previous colour scheme was sometimes left on Channel aircraft!

Photograph courtesy Gary Hillard.  Source unknown.

The enquiry took a very long time to report - some say an unreasonable time - the accident happened at the start of May 1962 yet the report was published in August 1963.  The survivors have said that partly as a result of this delay, the 2 year time limit for claiming compensation was reached and together with the  'pilot error' finding, they were denied any substantial compensation despite horrific injuries.  Eventually a small ex gratia payment - £3000 each - was made, plus a bunch of flowers. Can it really be said that 'conditions at Portsmouth played no part in the accident' - that is for the reader to decide.

The Co-pilot was specifically cleared of any blame by the  Air Ministry enquiry, but as often happens when there is no clear explanation, the Captain was held entirely responsible, although described as  'meticulous'.  In other cases , the damning finding of 'pilot error' has been claimed as expedient because it may have implications for limiting claims by passengers and next of kin,  and without a very clear reason it is a catch all finding that can make further responsibility very hard to determine and compensation difficult - or impossible to claim.  (There is for instance an ongoing argument regarding flight computers in the Isle of Mull Chinook accident which has been repeatedly blamed on 'negligence' of the crew). The Pilot certainly had an excellent reputation, was fully qualified on instruments  and very experienced, both on the DC3 and other heavy twin engine aircraft, so if nothing else, maybe whatever went wrong on that day would have happened to any other aircraft - and Captain -  in those circumstances.

 

 

Given the speed and nature of the impact, it was a miracle that there were any survivors at all, and the skill of the flight crew in those final moments enabled some passengers to escape although with serious injuries." Pilot error" is sometimes claimed to be an easy way out  - except for the Pilot and his family, and is almost impossible to disprove if the facts are not fully known, so it seems doubly sad that airline staff openly criticised a former and well respected colleague's actions at the inquest when he was unable, at that time, to reply.

Perhaps it was just a 'pyramid of circumstances', one small factor leading to another, an unfortunate decision, a minor error, an unseen change, all building up until the flight crew were overwhelmed by circumstances.   Although the Captain, as 'pilot in command' was ultimately responsible for the safety of the plane which descended below a safe height in low cloud, and hit a hill, you may think he had a raw deal.

AFTERWARDS

This was not a well publicised accident and after some screaming headlines, it quickly faded, only the local papers on the Isle of Wight and at Channel's home base of Southend providing long term coverage. Unfortunately that was not the case for survivors, relatives and witnesses who had to live with the result.

Of the 17 people on board, seven  survived the crash, but two died later in hospital.  The flight crew perished with their passengers on the hillside - both had families.  The stewardess died in hospital surrounded by flowers and messages from her colleagues and friends.

Among the dead were mothers and children, honeymoon couples, a student and service personnel.  Some had  booked the return flight a long time before, yet  others, like the crew, seem to have been there almost by chance.  The survivors were in hospital for almost a year and suffered terribly, although those to whom we have spoken show no bitterness or recrimination and are the nicest people you could wish to know. Airline staff and management were deeply distressed as the Company was close knit and very much a 'local' operation. One stewardess, a good friend of the one on the plane, handed in her notice and walked out, but mostly they all closed ranks and pressed on regardless. 

 

That this was the first and only passenger fatality in a long operating history and left a deep mark in what was a very safe operation.  Likewise rescuers, witnesses and families were deeply traumatised and still have memories of the events on that fog shrouded hillside. And somehow, even for those who were not there on that awful day, this accident never quite goes away.

There was a beneficial result, if anything  that followed can possibly ever be called that. After the accident enquiry,  aircraft documentation, navigational procedures and flight information were improved and all passenger airports were required to have radio communications. The situation regarding weather minima was clarified.  Sadly, and as usual, it took fatalities to overcome  inertia and for the 'powers that be' to introduce regulations that should have been in place and enforced long before 1962.  Operator licensing and beaurocracy had taken precedence over basic safety with predictable results.  A familiar story?

Over 40 years on there is little that can be done to reopen the investigation.   It would be pointless and distressing to survivors and relatives.  It all happened a long while ago and time is a great healer, even if loved ones are never forgotten.  Although the loss of life was relatively low compared with other aviation disasters, this crash somehow seems to epitomise all the human tragedy, horror and distress that occurs when an airliner is lost. Shattered lives, broken families,  a deep sadness and for some, a loneliness that continues to this day.

 

The 1960's were a time when when people were trusted and scenes like this were common at smaller airports.

 

CONCLUSION

This website has attempted to look at some possible reasons for the accident but is not an attempt to attribute blame or to make accusations. It was a long chain of events starting some years before that combined with last minute factors to create a disaster. Looking at the situation and following it through today, it is like a miniature version of the Titanic tragedy and  in some ways a miracle that it hadn't happened earlier.  But , like the Titanic, it was unavoidable in the prevailing knowledge, culture and practice of the day.

Surely anyone with common sense could have seen this accident coming? Any one of a number of people could have prevented it?   They could have - today - with hindsight - and  knowing what we do of the circumstances,  but those involved couldn't in 1962 because they were doing what they had always done, broken no rules,  and it had always worked safely. The airline had been flying Dakotas on this route for several years and since inception had never lost a passenger life - this was good for any airline at the time and for a high volume low cost operation it was truly exceptional.  Channel was a good and safe operation in anyone's terms.

In terms of the institutional culture of the Airline and Industry no one did anything that was particularly unusual, unsafe or even unwise.   They had flown in similar conditions many times before and nothing had happened, they had a good safety record, -  why should May 6th have been any different? Indeed it is only because of information and experience gained from  accidents like this that modern aviation is so safe.

If the plane had remained on the ground or flown directly back to Southend - if the crew had seen just a fleeting glimpse of Ventnor Town, or if they had been warned of how reduced the low level visibility would be as they approached the Isle of Wight, it would have been another uneventful day for South Coast aviation.  The passengers would have told of the wonderful and exciting flight they had along the Isle of Wight coast with a brilliant pilot who got them all home in awful weather. As it was, a combination of factors came together on  bleak hillside and caused a tragedy.  

Today all Hell would have broken loose after the crash with far reaching recriminations and many people might have been held to account, rightly or wrongly. It just wasn't like that in 1962 and when it is not possible to reach a definite conclusion in any accident, it is sometimes expedient to blame the Man in charge, close the case and learn rapidly and quietly from the experience. 

In this case the Ministry were in a prime position to prevent the situation arising.  They knew about the problem and the potential catastrophe - and failed to act. They then conducted the accident enquiry, took a very long time to produce the result while quickly taking behind the scenes action to preventing it happen again - and  blamed the pilot.  Surely this is a case for that modern favourite - a truly independent enquiry.  

This was the only accident in which Channel Airways ever lost a passenger life. However there is one thing of which you can be absolutely certain;  if anyone associated with this accident or involved with the Company, the Ministry, Met Office, or of course the crew, had thought for a moment that what they did - or did not do, might lead to an accident or incident of any kind, however unlikely, they would have done everything in their power to prevent it. That is not - and never will be - in any doubt.

 

 

Channel Airways postcard - these could be purchased on board.

 

 

THE MEMORIAL

We have tried to tell the story of the loss of Zulu Bravo,  what may - or may not -, have happened,  and perhaps why.  However this web site was created as a memorial and to be part of a larger presentation which we hoped would one day include a physical structure near the site of the crash.  Having achieved this, it became clear that while we had focused largely on those on board the plane, there were just as many who had never had even a mention.  These were the rescuers and emergency crews, those who had no choice but to be involved, or civilians who were catapulted into a life changing event because they felt it their duty to assist.  Some of these people were severely traumatised by the sights and events of that foggy holiday afternoon.  Others were injured trying to break open the gates to the compound where the wreckage lay, and several hurt themselves climbing the eight foot high fence in a frantic attempt to reach the passengers and crew. Families of the victims still feel terrible distress and like a stone in a pond the ripples are still there , still spreading outward, after all these years.

With over 120 people at the memorial dedication, it was obvious that this event had gone deep into the consciousness of those living on the Island at the time, while the arrival of colleagues of the crew from the other side of the country showed that their loss was still keenly felt.  At a time when trauma counseling had not been invented, these people had to come to terms with their experience without any help or external assistance. It has not been easy.

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Channel Airways uniform badge - picture source unknown

 

As we spoke to people who came to the service of dedication, the true extent of this hidden aspect of the tragedy became clear.  A number of rescuers, both in the emergency services and civilians were very badly affected, and continue to be so to this day.  Indeed one rescuer took his own life, unable to come to terms with what he had seen, while other witnesses and helpers had serious mental problems and live with the memories to this day. The fact that the wreckage - it was unrecognisable as a large airliner - was left open to the public for several days with luggage and personal effects strewn about the site, did nothing for those who came to see what had taken place.  Meanwhile the airline crews had to over fly the site on a daily basis which was distressing for everyone.  It was their friends who had been down there in that dirty and charred black mark in the gorse and foxgloves.

After the service we held a traditional English tea for those involved, at nearby St Lawrence village hall .  It was extremely concerning to hear people who were involved, or who had merely seen the aftermath of the incident 41 years before, recalling aspects of it as if it had happened that morning.  This is a side of many accidents that is swiftly forgotten and while it does nothing to lessen the distress and suffering of those who were directly involved, we need to remember the others who were there on the Down at, or shortly after the crash.  Everyone  who had contact with this dreadful business suffered to a greater or lesser degree and everyone from friends of airline staff to passengers has their own story.  This site is for them all.

The memorial plinth and column now stand on St Boniface Down, the highest point of the Isle of Wight.  It is not a large structure, and it does not stand out,  it was never intended to, but it is there, and anyone passing by or walking along the path to the crash site can pause for a moment to read the plaque, look out towards the Channel Islands and reflect on what happened that day long ago.  It is now known locally as the 'Dakota Memorial' and a meeting place for walkers and ramblers.

The memorial is for everyone who was touched by the accident; survivors, friends, families, colleagues, rescuers and helpers, and of course  the  crew and passengers aboard Zulu Bravo who took off on 6th May 1962, on a lovely Sunny afternoon in the Channel Islands - and  didn't come home.

They are not forgotten.

 

It was an accident. It was also a tragedy, but it was still an accident.

 

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G- AJIB lining up for take off - this is the later livery which we display on the memorial although we now know Zulu Bravo had the original BEA livery over painted green and with the airline name changed - Channel Airways didn't waste money on non essentials!

 

 

Channel Airways  closed in 1971 - the end of an era. 

This was the only accident that cost a passenger life in millions of miles flown.

 

 

 

 

Thank you to the various enthusiasts who have sent us Channel Airways  information and illustrations for the site. All material remains copyright of the original owner. If we have used an image without permission please contact us and we will remove, credit it or give you a link. However we hope that use of these images will be accepted in good faith - this site costs a great deal to maintain and is done as a memory to those involved, not as a money making venture. 

Channel was a wonderful operation and still has a great following.  In terms of safety it must have one of the best ratings of any transport operation in history.  We would be pleased to receive photographs or memories that can be added to the site or privately to our growing collection of memories as and when time permits.

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